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Since democracy was won in 1994, the African National Congress 
(ANC)-ruled post-apartheid state has suffered enormous erosion in key areas 
of its economic, social and environmental responsibilities. This reflected, in 
part, a coalescence of black-nationalist and white-corporate interests 
associated with the democratic transition, in which radical bottom-up 
impulses (community revolt, shopfloor power and the general 
delegitimization of the apartheid state) were gradually but decisively 
demobilized in favor of top-down elite-pacting. For corporate South Africa, 
moderate black rule was the necessary precondition for both a friendlier 
regulatory environment and massive capital flight. In terms of 
macroeconomic policy, the amplification of late-apartheid neoliberal 
economic policies — the highest interest rates in South African history 
through a newly-“independent” Reserve Bank, dramatic fiscal contraction, 
financial and trade liberalization, deregulation of commerce and the like — 
reflected the more general phenomenon associated with rising 
financial/commercial power during an advanced stage of economic 
stagnation. (Only labor market provisions demanded by a still-powerful trade 
union movement bucked the trend.) The economy was not rewarded with 
growth, and the emerging markets crisis led to two 30 percent crashes of the 
rand (in 1996 and 1998). Nor were “reconstruction and development” — the 
                                                          
*This paper was presented to the Union of Radical Political Economics conference “Political 
Economy, the Environment and Economic Crisis,” Bantam, Connecticut, in August 1999. It is 
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intended corollaries of the state and society’s deracialization — particularly 
successful. 1 
In this context, high hopes for a tough environmental policy, and for the 
relevant government departments taking on board environmentalist values 
and strategies, also quickly faded. In this article, three illustrative studies help 
to reveal how the ANC government has dealt with its disastrous 
environmental inheritance via high-profile infrastructure programs and 
projects. In particular, they allow us to consider some of the more obvious 
sites of conflicting interests and argumentation.2 We briefly consider 
competing analyses associated with ongoing development projects that are 
emblematic partly because of political debate associated with each, and partly 
because each has enormous ecological implications: 
firstly, how levels and financing systems of basic-needs 
infrastructure (typically for new housing projects and in situ shack-
settlement upgrades, mainly oriented to water/sanitation and 
electricity) were chosen by the Departments of Constitutional 
Development and Water Affairs and Forestry from 1995-97, with 
an instrumentalist regard for ecological inequalities; 
secondly, at the local level, how choices over allocating natural 
resources between basic-needs infrastructure and large-scale 
economic infrastructure (namely, a proposed zinc smelter plus 
Industrial Development Zone in the country’s fourth-largest city) 
reflect both low environmental priorities and the economic 
balance of forces; and 
thirdly, how a 1998 decision to speed up the cross-catchment 
transfer of water from Lesotho to the Johannesburg region will 
                                                          
1For a sample of recent books that document the transition from a critical perspective, see P. 
Bond, Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa (London: Pluto Press, 2000); 
H. Marais, South Africa: The Political Economy of Transformation (London: Zed, 1998); M. 
Mayekiso, Township Politics: Civic Struggles for a New South Africa (New York: Monthly Review, 
1996); and M. Murray, Revolution Deferred (London: Verso, 1994). 
2Such “discourses” are explained in D. Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996), Chapter 13; and in relation to South African environmental 
legislation, in P. Bond and R. Stein, “Competing Discourses of Environmental and Water 
Management in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” in W. Wehrmeyer and Y. Mulugetta, eds., 
Growing Pains: Environmental Management in Developing Countries (London: Greenleaf Publications, 
1999). 
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likely play itself out with respect to environmental concerns and 
urban water/sanitation services. 
Throughout, we find an interplay of three different ecological 
perspectives. The first discourse is an “orthodox economic” concern with 
maximizing Gross Domestic Product, showing only passing attention to 
associated environmental problems. The orthodox economic approach is 
expressed well, if in a caricatured form, in the infamous 1991 memo signed 
by the then-chief economist of the World Bank (and more recently, leading 
US Treasury official and global economic crisis manager), Lawrence 
Summers: “I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste 
in the lowest-wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that.” 
Rather than “internalize the externalities” associated with pollution or 
ecological damage, the ready solution is to try to simply displace these to 
somewhere political power is negligible and the immediate environmental 
implications are less visible, in the name of overall economic growth. After 
all, Summers continued, inhabitants of low-income countries typically die 
before the age at which they would begin suffering prostate cancer.3 Versions 
of this discourse include the Wise Use movement and other arguments that 
place private property relations first and foremost in the ordering of society. 
A second discourse offers a longer-term, somewhat more comprehensive 
(if thoroughly technicist) accounting of environmental processes within 
society. The argument on behalf of “sustainable development,” drawing from 
Brundtland Commission ideology and endorsed by high-profile capitalist 
politicians like Margaret Thatcher and Al Gore, has been termed “ecological 
modernization.” Externalities such as pollution should, in the classical 
example, be brought into the marketplace in such a manner as to assure that 
these costs are adequately accounted for in “polluter-pays” profit-loss 
calculations. However, prevention is preferable. State regulation and even 
outright controls on environmentally damaging activity are willingly 
recognized as potentially beneficial within this school of thought, and the 
rights of future generations are also factored in. 
The third discourse we can label “environmental justice,” for it sites the 
issues of ecological damage within a socio-political context first and foremost, 
and poses firm moral and distributional questions about that context 
                                                          
3Cited in the Economist, February 8, 1992. 
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(sometimes resorting to cultural defenses and symbolic critique). At one level, 
this rights-based discourse is grounded in values so well recognized that they 
were included in the South African Constitution’s Bill of Rights in 1996:  
“everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health 
or well-being... everyone has the right to have access to health care services, 
including reproductive health care; sufficient food and water; and social 
security...”  
Tellingly, however, that Constitution also provided a caveat in mandating 
“reasonable legislative and other measures that prevent pollution and 
ecological degradation, promote conservation, and secure ecologically 
sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development” (emphasis added), quite consistent with 
ecological modernization. And, underlining the central orthodox economic 
precept, it went on immediately to specify that “No one may be deprived of 
property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property.” 4  
Hence democratic South Africa is, even in its founding document, beset 
by conflicting discourses, the ramifications of which will be tested in the 
Constitutional Court for decades to come. Overall, the sense of liberal 
capitalist democracy prevails, augmented by “second-generation” rights 
beyond simply freedom of speech, association and the like. These include 
citizens’ rights to housing and water, ironically, but their realization is unlikely 
given the harsh reality of residual (and in some cases expanding) apartheid-era 
economic power relations, documented in these emblematic cases of 
environmental injustice and ongoing ecological destruction. 
 
BASIC MUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 
Decisions about municipal infrastructure and services provision to low-
income urban and rural South Africans — what kind, how much and at what 
price — offer not only a particular case of environmental management, but 
also help reflect more generally the economic ideology adopted by the South 
African government amidst competing socio-ecological discourses, and also 
                                                          
4Republic of South Africa, The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, Cape 
Town, sections 24.a, 27.1, 24.b, 25.1, 1996. 
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the manner in which a policy debate emerged and was, at least temporarily, 
resolved. 5 
The Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework (MIIF) describes the main 
infrastructure and services options planned by the central government for 
local government implementation. This framework, according to the 
Department of Constitutional Development’s (DCD) “User-Friendly Guide” 
to MIIF, entailed “an economic modelling exercise to estimate services 
backlogs, assess the capital costs that are involved in removing these 
backlogs, and calculate the recurrent costs of operating and maintaining the 
services.”6 The orthodox economic perspective thus simply set the capital 
investment associated with various options against estimated available fiscal 
resources (with “public-private partnership” augmentation through 
privatization of some municipal functions). In the process, it correlated the 
amounts of services to be provided — whether a house/yard tap or 
communal tap; whether a flush toilet or pit latrine; whether a 60 amp 
electrical connection or none at all — to households’ ability to pay. And it 
established prepaid metering systems or assured recourse to services cut-offs 
so as to diminish the incentive of consumers not to pay for what they 
received. 
Such an orthodox economic perspective — with no consideration for 
ecological values, for the need to mitigate public health hazards, for potential 
economic spin-offs from expanded municipal services, for the importance of 
relatively high-standard service levels in achieving geographical desegregation, 
or for the gender equalization potential of better municipal services — was 
the core discourse adopted in the MIIF’s predecessor, the (1995) Urban 
Infrastructure Investment Framework (UIIF). Based mainly upon direct World 
                                                          
5For more details on content, see P. Bond, “Basic Infrastructure for Socio-Economic 
Development, Ecological Sustainability and Geographical Desegregation: South Africa’s 
Unmet Challenge,” Geoforum, 30, 1, 1999a; P. Bond, Cities of Gold, Townships of Coal: Essays on 
South Africa’s New Urban Crisis (Trenton: Africa World Press, Part Two, 1999b); and P. Bond, 
G. Dor and G. Ruiters, “Transformation in Infrastructure Policy, from Apartheid to 
Democracy: Mandates for Change, Continuities in Ideology, Frictions in Delivery,” in M. 
Khosa and Y. Muthien, eds., Infrastructure for Reconstruction in South Africa (Pretoria, Human 
Sciences Research Council and London: Ashgate Press, 1999). 
6Department of Constitutional Development, Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework, 
Pretoria, 1997, p. 2. 
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Bank policy advice and drafting, the UIIF entailed a variety of class, race, 
geographical and gender biases which cemented existing patterns of inequality 
through market mechanisms. 
The inherited inequality was itself a formidable barrier to both growth 
(given domestic demand constraints) and socio-environmental justice. South 
Africa is the second most unequal large country in the world (after Brazil). 
The poorest 20 percent of the population earns only three percent of the 
national income, while the income share of the top 20 percent of the 
population exceeds 60 percent. The wealthiest 2.4 million South Africans 
account for over 40 percent of all consumption, while the poorest 21 million 
account for under 10 percent. The ratios for consumption of basic necessities 
such as water and energy are even more skewed. There is limited or non-
existent access to infrastructure, education, primary health care and socio-
economic opportunities for the majority of people (especially rural women). 
Only 38 percent of “African” households have access to electricity for 
cooking, heating or lighting (while nearly all “colored,” “Indian,” and “white” 
households have access to electricity). Only 27 percent of African households 
have running tap water inside their residences, only 34 percent have access to 
flush toilets, and only 37 percent have their refuse removed by a local 
authority. 
In this context, the UIIF’s overall orientation was towards the 
segregation of low-income (black) people in new, far-away slum settlements 
— typically located further from the cities than even the notorious townships, 
primarily so as to lower land acquisition costs — with very low levels of 
services (e.g., no electricity, communal taps, and mass pit latrines instead of 
water-born sanitation). The main constraints that the World Bank team 
established within the UIIF’s discursive strategy included the limited overall 
fiscal resources available to South Africa for the purposes of subsidizing 
recurrent (not even capital) expenditure on municipal services; a cost-
recovery approach so that “operating and maintenance” (marginal) expenses 
would be covered in full by recipients; and low-income households’ quite 
limited ability to pay (given South Africa’s vast impoverished population). 
(Later, each of these three premises was criticized, but by starting out with 
narrow parameters, the Bank team came up with a predictably narrow set of 
services options.) 
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By late 1995, a draft Urban Development Strategy (UDS) codified 
government thinking on service provision. The UDS summary demonstrated 
the low level of standards then contemplated for urban areas (rural 
infrastructure plans had not been developed at that stage):  “communal 
standpipes (water), on site sanitation, graded roads with gravel and open 
stormwater drains and streetlights (electricity). These services will be targeted 
at households with an income of less than US$200 per month and charged 
for at between US$9 and US$12 per month.”7 
While the rationale for such low standards and such careful correlation of 
ability to pay appeared economically reasonable, it did not account for either 
the multiple positive externalities associated with provision of higher levels of 
services or the political mandate the ANC had won the election with, namely 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). By way of illustration, the 
UIIF claimed, notwithstanding great evidence to the contrary, that “There are 
no major environmental problems anticipated for this project.”8 In contrast, 
the RDP recognized the funding gap and specified the need for tariff 
restructuring and cross-subsidies with respect to both water (including 
sanitation) and electricity. Moreover, according to the RDP, in the case of 
water “the national tariff structure must include...a lifeline tariff to ensure that 
all South Africans are able to afford water services sufficient for health and 
hygiene requirements.” Likewise the extension of electricity to all households 
“must be financed from within the industry as far as possible via cross-
subsidies from other electricity consumers.”9 
Yet the possibility of large national users of water and electricity paying 
higher than their marginal cost — not least so as to promote conservation, 
given South Africa’s enormous legacy of water wastage — was ruled out (the 
World Bank did not even include it within the four funding options under 
consideration). Cross-subsidization was intrinsically a (market-distorting) 
device to be avoided, in the view of Bank resource economists. To illustrate, 
                                                          
7Ministry of Reconstruction and Development, Urban Development Strategy, Pretoria, 1995, pp. 
24-25. 
8Ministry of Reconstruction and Development, Urban Infrastructure Investment Framework, 
Pretoria, 1995, p. 54. 
9African National Congress, The Reconstruction and Development Programme (Johannesburg: 
Umanyano Publications, 1994), sections 2, 6, 10, 2, 7, 8. 
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key Bank water expert John Roome sternly advised the Minister of Water 
Affairs that cross subsidies “may limit options with respect to tertiary 
providers” and that “in particular private concessions [would be] much 
harder to establish.”10 (Roome later gloated that his “power-point 
presentation to Department of Water Affairs” in October, 1995 was 
“instrumental in facilitating a radical revision in South Africa’s approach to 
bulk water management.”)11 
It is useful, as an aside, to recount the orthodox economic argument 
here. A declining marginal cost curve associated with bulk supply to large 
users would, through cross-subsidization of low-income, small-scale 
consumers, be translated into a rising marginal revenue curve (and vice versa), 
which would distort the profit maximization calculus (by which marginal 
costs and marginal revenues run in parallel). Forcing service providers to 
cross-subsidize low-consumption blocks by raising the marginal price for 
high levels of consumption would, then, serve as a formidable disincentive to 
privatization. In contrast, evoking socio-environmental justice, the SA 
Municipal Workers Union addressed this relationship explicitly in their 1998 
bumper sticker:  “50 Liters of Water Free, No to Privatization!” 
Public criticism mounted, mainly that the low UIIF/UDS services 
standards and government’s failure to provide for recurrent subsidies were 
incompatible with ANC election promises. After the UIIF, draft UDS and 
early drafts of the MIIF (which added even lower rural standards) were 
published, the controversy intensified. In 1997, facing political pressure, 
DCD made some modifications to urban infrastructure standards. Instead of 
no electricity, there was the potential for urban households to receive an eight 
                                                          
10J. Roome, “Water Pricing and Management,” World Bank Presentation to the SA Water 
Conservation Conference, Johannesburg, October 2, 1995, pp. 50-51. 
11World Bank, South Africa: Country Assistance Strategy (Washington, DC: Annex C, 1999), p. 5. 
In addition to telling Asmal to drop proposals for a free lifeline tariff and rising block tariffs, 
Roome’s power-point presentation included the following advice: 
 • Asmal must ensure both urban and rural municipalities establish a “credible threat 
of cutting service” to non-paying residents; 
 • he should be “very careful about irrigation for ‘previously disadvantaged’ South 
Africans;” and instead 
 • the “key lies in voluntary solutions — trading water rights,” assuming that 
emergent black farmers could compete financially with the larger (and historically-subsidized) 
white commercial enterprises. 
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Amp supply (not strong enough, however, for heating or cooking), and 
instead of paying US$9-12 per month for these services, a subsidy of 
approximately US$12 per low-income household was planned. 
Critics rejoined that such a small subsidy would not be sufficient to cover 
basic operating costs, and moreover there remained enormous doubt whether 
the grant is sustainable given budget constraints and macroeconomic 
stagnation. In any case, there are substantial doubts about this “targeted-
grant” method of subsidy given the administrative costs of means-testing and 
the stigmatization with which means-testing is associated. In addition, rural 
households would still have much lower standards. And for urban 
households with less than US$200 income per month (i.e., between a quarter 
and a third of urban households within a decade), the new MIIF continued to 
recommend a Ventilated Improved Pit-latrine given that poor households 
would not be able to afford to flush, as well as communal (not house or yard) 
standpipes, a weak electricity supply, gravel roads, open storm-water drains, 
and communal waste dumps (not curbside removal) under the (in retrospect, 
optimistic) “low-growth” late 1990s macroeconomic scenario. 
Part of the rationale for the marginal improvement in MIIF’s service 
standards and the new recurrent subsidy was the recognition, compatible with 
the ecological modernization perspective, that indeed there were some 
important public health and economic benefits associated with infrastructure 
and services. But this calculation was notional, and, for example, the 
ecological harm associated with the low infrastructure standards was not 
considered seriously. It must be acknowledged, of course, that the 
environmental impact of increased infrastructure and services is complex, for 
both benefits and costs are associated with higher levels of services and 
consumption. It is generally accepted that large-scale bulk infrastructure 
projects (such as major dams or roads through ecologically sensitive areas) are 
to be avoided. But incorporating the benefits of infrastructure remains 
crucial. Simply in comparing pit latrines to water-borne sewage, for example, 
it is clear from South African research that if installed properly, the latter is 
potentially a far more environmentally-friendly approach (particularly in the 
many urban areas affected by inopportune geological and topographical 
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conditions).12 Moreover, if low-income households (typically organized by 
women care-givers) replaced subsidized electricity — which is presently too 
expensive — for coal or wood (gathered locally, leading to deforestation and 
erosion) for purposes of cooking and heating, there would be enormous 
household and urban/rural environmental benefits.13 
                                                          
12For details see P. Bond, 1999a, op. cit. Aspects that have been researched in South Africa and 
elsewhere include pit latrine-related pollution of surface and ground water, and public health 
improvements that come from higher-level sanitation. In the case of surface water, point and 
non-point source pollution from dense urban settlement mean that many urban streams and 
rivers do not meet effluent standards established by the government. Surface water contains 
large concentrations of bacterial contaminants, organic silt, and nutrients, along with toxins 
and oil, which in turn kill off aquatic life in urban streams and pollute the major raw water 
supply reservoirs. Typical water-treatment plants are ill-equipped to adequately purify the 
increasingly polluted water. In addition, while groundwater remains three to five times cheaper 
to develop than surface water sources, pollution to aquifers is difficult to clean up. Amongst 
key pollutants are solid waste dumps, leaking underground storage tanks, fertilizers and 
pesticides, but in addition the lack of sanitation in informal settlements has had a major 
adverse impact on groundwater in many parts of South Africa. In addition, lack of water access 
is associated with higher rates of cholera, malaria, dengue, filariasis, yellow fever, and 
tuberculosis. In particular, diarrheal disease (which is responsible for almost a quarter of deaths 
amongst black and colored South African children between 1 and 4 years of age) has been 
attributed to primary risk factors including the absences of an inside tap, a flush toilet in the 
home, a refuse receptacle, and electricity, as well as low household income and lower than 
Standard Five maternal education. The difference between a flush toilet and pit latrine is 
estimated to account for a 20 percent difference in diarrhea prevalence. Costs associated with 
pollution and public health have been estimated, and outweigh the slight additional capital 
costs of installing indoor plumbing and adding sewage treatment capacity, in comparison to 
ventilated-improved pit latrine construction. 
 However, it must also be said that the case for more general conversion of sanitation 
systems from water-borne to solid-waste/composting is increasingly compelling, given sanitary 
technological advances in Scandinavia, the U.S. and elsewhere. The immediate issue in South 
Africa, however, is whether neoliberal (not “natural resource”) constraints lower the quality of 
life of the black majority, or whether a level of equality can be achieved in terms of at least a 
common universal lifeline supply of water and electricity to meet daily needs (entailing a tiny 
fraction — less than 5 percent if achieved — of total water and electricity usage). 
13Although a minor amount more environmentally-destructive generating capacity would be 
needed in the long-term (because during the 1990s there was typically 30 percent over capacity 
due to 1980s overbidding), the benefits of a universal supply of basic household electricity far 
outweigh environmental and economic costs. Increased household electricity would result in 
diminished air pollution from coal and wood fires, diminished fuelwood collection, and a 
variety of public health improvements. Some of these costs (such as indoor air pollution) are 
limited to households, while others (deforestation, pollution caused by burning coal in urban 
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None of these arguments were terribly controversial within the ecological 
modernization discourse, as even the World Bank’s World Development Report 
confirmed in 1994:  “Environment-friendly infrastructure services are 
essential for improving living standards and offering public health protection. 
With sufficient care, providing the infrastructure necessary for growth and 
poverty reduction can be consistent with concern for natural resources and 
the global environment (the ‘green’ agenda). At the same time, well-designed 
and well-managed infrastructure can promote the environmental 
sustainability of human settlements (the ‘brown’ agenda).”14 (That 1994 
report even endorsed cross-subsidies and lifeline tariffs, but was ignored by 
the Bank’s South Africa staff later the same year.) But while the final MIIF 
recognized the environmental issues more explicitly, it often did so by way of 
denying that low standards would have an adverse impact. DCD thus 
considered it reasonable to incorporate an ecological modernization discourse 
yet remain within a framework ultimately defined by orthodox economic 
cost-recovery principles (a common danger, internationally). Indeed, the very 
term “lifeline” was redefined by the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry to mean “operating and maintenance charges” (i.e., “marginal cost 
pricing,” fully in tune with an orthodox economic approach). As a result, the 
technical critique of infrastructure policy was diverted into a debate about the 
degree of harm done by low standards or the potential benefit from higher 
standards, with World Bank staff and allied consultants holding the balance 
of power not through a winning argument but through fiscal restraint and 
conservative bureaucratic bias. 
The alternative proposal advocated by social change activists from 
community organizations and associated NGOs, compatible with an 
environmental justice perspective (and with the Constitution and RDP), was a 
universal free lifeline to all South African consumers for the first block of 
water (50 liters of water per person each day) and electricity (1 kiloWatt hour 
                                                                                                                                     
neighborhoods) are externalities that society as a whole pays for. Electricity also protects 
biodiversity, aesthetics, and visibility. In the field of public health, South African studies 
suggest that a universal supply of electricity would curtail more than 3,000 deaths each year due 
to acute respiratory infection (caused by wood/coal burning), burns, and paraffin poisoning. 
(See ibid.) 
14World Bank, World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), p.20. 
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per day) with steeply-rising prices for subsequent consumption blocks. There 
would be no need, in this policy framework, for means-testing or a complex 
administrative apparatus. Thus recurrent consumption expenses would be 
paid for entirely from within each sector, although an additional 10 percent 
expenditure would be needed, beyond what the MIIF budgeted, to finance 
the added capital costs (totalling US$28 billion — to be invested over 10 
years — which was reasonable in relation to mid-1990s GDP of US$110 
billion and an annual state budget of close to US$40 billion). The social 
change option was thus radical yet eminently realistic. More than the final 
MIIF, it took seriously the environmental and other externalities associated 
with infrastructure and services. 
Where the social change advocates came up short, however, was in 
turning an extensive series of urban popular riots over municipal services — 
which, tragically, included the assassination of an ANC mayor known for 
being willing to cut power and water, as well as the burning of several ANC 
councillors’ houses — into more sustained, constructive political pressure 
(this partly reflected the demobilization of the national “civic association” 
movement during the late 1990s). In contrast to an alliance between DCD 
and the big business lobby within the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (the stakeholder forum at which state policies were often 
debated), the progressive forces failed, in 1996-97, to successfully contest the 
intensification of services commodification. Moreover, notwithstanding firm 
opposition by the progressive SA Municipal Workers Union, there was 
insufficient social weight to challenge the central government’s inclination 
towards municipal privatization (to the latter end, DCD leaders attempted to 
pit services-starved residents against allegedly labor-aristocrat municipal 
workers). 
Two other factors were at stake in this class struggle. Implicitly, social 
policy was a fight over the degree to which a capitalist state in league with big 
business could construct a “social wage” policy framework that had, as an 
objective, maintaining relatively low upward pressure on the private-sector 
wage floor. In other words, by keeping monthly operating costs of services 
low through denying workers access to flush toilets, hot plates and heating 
elements, the MIIF also reduced the pressures that workers would otherwise 
have to impose upon their employers for wages sufficient for the 
reproduction of labor-power. This was indirectly recognized by big business 
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in its strong historical advocacy of a site-and-(limited) service “self-help” 
housing program which would reduce monthly costs associated with 
laborpower reproduction, in an environment with extremely strong trade 
unions and extremely high unemployment (officially, more than 30 percent). 
But, second, a more vulgar question arose as to whether big business should 
sacrifice competitiveness and growth just for the sake of cross-subsidizing a 
large number of citizens who would forever remain unemployed and on the 
far periphery of the formal economy, a question government answered in the 
negative.15 
The oppositional discourse alone — based on ecological modernization 
arguments (public health savings of giving people free services, etc.) and 
abstract rights principles — may not have been at fault in all of this. For in 
very practical ways, the social and labor movements were too weak to 
successfully contest the broader trajectory. Not even the strongest eco-
socialist rhetorical critique could have made up for lack of political clout. 
What loomed ahead, as more than half of South Africa’s 878 municipalities 
prepared to face formal bankruptcy at the turn of the 21st century — due to 
declining central-local grants and low levels of service payments by residents 
— was a (neoliberal) version of municipal environmental management. 
“Municipal governance” will therefore not only entail more challenging forms 
of social control of local populations at their sites of residence. In addition, 
local managers will have to grapple with a variety of urban pollution 
problems associated with the low levels of basic-needs infrastructure and the 
inadequate consumption subsidies. This will transpire, in part, by municipal 
officials blaming the victims for non-payment and engaging in widespread 
cut-offs of municipal services, hence generating future environmental crises 
of both a green and brown character. 
 
                                                          
15In late 1996, government’s main infrastructure bureaucrat was challenged in the press about 
his failure to adopt the RDP provision that services such as electricity and water should be 
cross-subsidized. Alusaf, the big aluminum plant in Richard’s Bay, for instance, received 
electricity at roughly $0.003 per kilowatt hour while rural consumers often paid as high as 
$0.08. The bureaucrat’s response, to the Mail and Guardian (22 November 1996) was simply, “If 
we increase the price of electricity to users like Alusaf, their products will become 
uncompetitive and that will affect our balance of payments.” 
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THE COEGA PORT, ZINC SMELTER AND INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT ZONE 
If cost recovery was prioritized in the case of municipal infrastructure, in 
contrast dramatic capital and operating subsidies are the basis for considering 
comparative cost-benefit analysis as applied to the city of Port Elizabeth 
(midway between Cape Town and Durban, on the Indian Ocean), particularly 
its environmentally-destructive Coega project.16 At stake are vast quantities of 
public subsidies, not only for construction of a major deep-water port at 
Coega (replicating facilities at Port Elizabeth but with 20 meters of clearance 
instead of 12 meters), but also vast recurrent subsidies for cheap water and 
electricity consumption by large corporations. Simultaneously, the lack of 
access to inexpensive infrastructure-services to low-income citizens highlights 
the distributional effects of the orthodox economic discourse. 
More than 1.2 million people live in the Port Elizabeth metropolitan area, 
but the city’s mid-19th century industrialization and present concentration of 
government-based employment belie extreme levels of poverty which exist 
primarily in a few very large black townships.17 A combination of key socio-
economic conditions — income, health (life expectancy) and literacy — make 
up the Human Development Index (HDI), and Port Elizabeth’s HDI of 0.67 
(on a scale where 1 is the highest, 0 the lowest), based on the 1991 census, is 
roughly equivalent to that of South Africa as a whole. However, the HDI for 
the city’s African residents is 0.32, compared to 0.94 for white residents.18 
Huge backlogs exist in access to basic shelter and infrastructural facilities. 
The powerful Port Elizabeth Regional Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry argues that the areas’s future lies in its role as a Southern Africa 
regional transport hub and industrial export platform, particularly through the 
proposal to establish a new deep-water port and 10,000-hectares Industrial 
Development Zone (IDZ) at Coega, just to the north of the city. The primary 
                                                          
16This section represents a summary of S. Hosking and P. Bond, “Infrastructure for Spatial 
Development Initiatives or for Basic Needs? Port Elizabeth’s Prioritization of the Coega 
Port/IDZ over Municipal Services,” in M. Khosa and Y. Muthien, eds., 1999, op. cit.. 
17For a history see J. Robinson, The Power of Apartheid: State Power and Space in South African 
Cities (Oxford, Butterworth-Heinemann, 1996). 
18Institute for Development Planning and Research, “The Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage 
Socio-Economic Development Monitor 1997,” Port Elizabeth, 1997, pp. 8, 11-13. 
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rationale for this combination is to reduce the substantial transport costs 
associated with heavy industry, especially a zinc smelter proposed by Billiton, 
a subsidiary of the Afrikaner-dominated mining group Gencor (and which 
until the mid-1990s was owned by Shell Oil). One of Billiton’s most 
important assets is its chief executive, who in a previous position as treasurer 
of the parastatal Eskom power company, approved arrangements that led to 
sales of electricity to a similar electricity-consuming (aluminum) coastal 
smelter at an extremely low price. Extremely cheap electricity is also a 
precondition for the Coega smelter. In return, South Africa has been 
promised expanded GDP and employment. 
But while the short-term investment amounts are relatively large (US$750 
million for the port, related infrastructure, proposed zinc and phosphoric acid 
plants and a cement facility, with more potential investment expected in 
subsequent IDZ phases), the jobs are few (just 850 for the first phase). 
Neighboring community residents welcome any new jobs, and at first blush 
the debate over Coega has appeared to be the traditional one between 
environmentalists and prospective workers. But matters are more 
complicated when one considers the kinds of “brown” issues associated with 
household ecology, and with the diversion of water and energy resources to 
the smelter. 
For Coega’s own ecological footprint will be large and deep. 
Notwithstanding cabinet-level assurances given by Trade and Industry 
Minister Alec Erwin that “The environmental issue has been addressed and 
will continue to be addressed,”19 concerns persistently arise — and have not 
been conclusively answered by Coega champions — regarding the extent to 
which local ecology will be protected. The need for independent analysis was 
highlighted by R. Fuggle’s critique of Coega’s “Strategic Environmental 
Assessment”: “There is no analysis of possible policy or programme 
alternatives, no systematic comparison of alternatives, and no analysis of how 
existing activities (e.g., salt extraction, citrus farming, market gardening, 
dairying) will be affected by the new initiatives.”20 
                                                          
19Bay Public Relations, “Coega Construction Expected to Start Soon,” Press release, Port 
Elizabeth, April 5, 1998. 
20R. Fuggle, “Review of Documentation Pertaining to Coega IDZ Initiative,” for Eastern 
Cape Citrus Forum, Port Elizabeth, July 14, 1997. 
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The many potential victims of Coega’s environmental damage include a 
proposed national elephant park expansion nearby, beaches, estuaries, islands 
and whales. The Coega Environmental Impact Review recognized that eco-
tourism may constitute an opportunity cost of the Coega IDZ, however, the 
issue is not explored.21 Such costs entail the consumer surplus and tourist 
revenue foregone as a result of locating the park further away from PE, and 
the tourist revenues associated with marine and beach use. Using the 
Clawson-Knetsch Travel Cost Method, Geach estimated the existing park’s 
annual recreational value to be over US$50 million.22 McGrath and Horner 
estimated that line fisheries in South Africa’s coastal provinces generated 
about US$350 million in income (about 1.3 percent of the GGP of these 
provinces) and about 131,560 jobs, which if applied proportionately to Port 
Elizabeth is worth about US$32 million per annum.23 Although no studies 
have been carried out on the recreational values of visitors to beaches, dunes 
and islands in the Coega area (e.g., bathers, divers and hikers), presumably 
this also would be substantial (even recognizing that income generated for 
such recreational uses is primarily sourced from higher-income households, 
whereas the non-pecuniary satisfaction of those users of the Coega area from 
lower-income households may also be substantial, even if impossible to 
enumerate). In sum, based on those studies that have been carried out the 
total annual recreational value of the natural assets negatively affected by the 
Coega IDZ and Harbour Project could be in the region of US$82 million. If 
only 10 percent — a guesstimate — of this is lost due to the Coega IDZ and 
Harbour Project, the ecotourism opportunity cost per annum is US$8 million. 
Some ecological costs have been factored in to Coega’s rates-of-return 
calculations, including the closure of important commercial fishing grounds 
                                                          
21CEN, Integrated Environmental Management, Environmental Impact Report on a Proposed Harbour in 
the Vicinity of Coega, Port Elizabeth, June 11, 1997, p. 253. 
22B. Geach, “The Addo Elephant National Park as a Model of Sustainable Land Use through 
Ecotourism,” M Sc. Dissertation, University of Port Elizabeth, Port Elizabeth, 1997. 
23M. McGrath and C. Horner, “An Economic Valuation of the South African Linefishery,” 
Paper presented to the EBM Research Conference, University of Port Elizabeth, Port 
Elizabeth, November, 27-28, 1996. 
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as a result of increased commercial shipping in the area;24 increased pollution 
in Algoa Bay;25 and the effects of dredging on currents in Algoa Bay, reduced 
photosynthetic activity, and disturbance of natural and anthropogenic 
contaminants in silts.26 But other environmental costs to neighboring citrus, 
vegetable and animal industries were not fully factored in, and include 
fluoride and other emissions into the air (and possibly wastes into 
subterranean water reserves) from heavy industries to be located in the Coega 
IDZ. In particular, sulphur dioxide emissions are anticipated to be 
dangerously close to the point at which damage is expected to occur to 
plants. If the undermining effect is equivalent to 5 percent of the citrus yield 
alone, there will be an annual income sacrifice of about US$4 million, as well 
as unquantifiable cost to citrus farmworker jobs. Moreover, if the zinc, 
phosphoric acid and cement plants use up most of the “safe” capacity 
available in the air to assimilate pollutants, others after them will necessarily 
be more constrained in what they can do and the Coega IDZ site will be less 
appealing to prospective investors. 
Nor were health costs adequately considered in Coega’s planning. Since 
the 1900s mortality rates have fallen for most major causes of death. The 
most conspicuous exception is cancer, even amongst cohorts in which the 
percentage of smokers has decreased.27 Increased exposure to toxic 
substances is thought to be a cause, although this is difficult to prove, due to 
the long latency periods for cancer (from 15 to 40 years). Based on the fact 
that the zinc smelter and phosphoric acid plant will substantially increase the 
levels of toxins in the area, an increase in the incidence of cancer could be 
expected amongst its residents some time after they commence production. 
In addition there may well be a negative effect on health in the short term, 
                                                          
24T.H. Wooldridge, N.T. Klages and M.J. Smale, “Proposed Harbour Development at Coega 
(Feasibility Phase): Specialist Report on the Near-Shore Environment,” Report commissioned 
by the Coega IDZ Section 21 Company, Port Elizabeth, 1997. 
25African Environmental Solutions, Proposed Eastern Cape Zinc Refinery and Associated Phosphoric 
Acid Plant: Final Environmental Impact Report, Report for the Coega Authority, Cape Town, May, 
1997, pp. 178,180. 
26Ibid., pp. 175, 178, 180. 
27T.H. Tietenberg, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, Third Edition (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1992), p. 512. 
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from sulphur dioxide and heavy metal emissions.28 The former is widely 
acknowledged as a respirator irritant and a bronchoconstrictor, whose effects 
seem to be particularly acute for asthmatics, which include a disproportionate 
share of low-income people. The levels of sulphur dioxide that would be 
emitted by proposed industrial facilities at Coega could lead to a three percent 
increase in mortality in the vicinity of Port Elizabeth.29 The heavy metal 
emission from the proposed facilities at Coega are potential carcinogens, 
particularly zinc emissions and smaller quantities of arsenic, cadmium, cobalt, 
mercury, nickel and silver. These emissions not only pose a potential threat 
through direct transmission to humans, but also through accumulation in 
plants and soils which is then passed on to humans.30  
If, therefore, the estimated national income associated with the first 
phase of Coega is US$32 million, and if the most optimistic projections add 
another US$133 million, the costs associated with Coega’s port, zinc smelter 
and IDZ (roughly US$18 million) should also be — but have not been in any 
meaningful “polluter-pays” method — factored in. But there are still other 
publicly-born costs in the form of Coega’s anticipated use of water and 
electricity which tip the balance toward an alternative development strategy 
yet further. The proposed zinc smelter and phosphoric acid plant alone are 
expected to consume 4.9 million cubic meters of fresh water and 968 billion 
Watt hours per annum. 
The opportunity cost of water must be taken into account, because in 
some parts of the Eastern Cape, including the Algoa Bay, a decision to devote 
                                                          
28N.F. Tennille and T.P.G. Le Quesne, “Proposed IDZ and Harbour at Coega: The Issues,” 
Unpublished paper circulated by Southern Africa Environment Project, Port Elizabeth, 1997. 
29K. Katsouyanni, G. Touloumi, C. Spix, J. Schwartz, F. Balducci, S. Medina, G. Rossi, B. 
Wojtyniak, J. Sunyer, L. Bacharova, J.P. Schouten, A. Ponka, and H.R. Anderson, “Short Term 
Effects of Ambient Sulphur Dioxide and Particulate Matter on Mortality in 12 European 
Cities: Results from Time Series Data from the APHEA Project,” British Medical Journal, 314, 
1997, pp. 1658-1663. 
30Here, contamination occurs through much lower levels, because toxicity levels in plants and 
soil can accumulate over a period of time. Assuming an estimated 100,000 work days per year 
are lost due to increased pollutant levels in the environment (valuing each work day at US$11), 
and adding the transfers of income required to care for the sick (which could easily triple this 
cost), the total cost of decreased human health per annum could be on the order of US$3.5 
million. 
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water resources to one project may well preclude another, either by 
eliminating its supply or by making its supply too expensive (if not 
immediately, at some time in the near future). The water requirement of the 
proposed zinc and phosphoric acid complex is 13.3 Ml/day, while the current 
average water demand for all existing industries in Port Elizabeth is just 14.6 
Ml/day.31 Current readily available bulk water supplies from local rivers are 
insufficient for Port Elizabeth, especially in times of drought, and so Port 
Elizabeth supplements its supplies from across the catchment into the 
Orange River system. That system has also shown signs of stress, and it has 
been impossible since mid-1993 for Port Elizabeth citrus farmers to acquire 
increased water rights. Whether the IDZ should be the favored consumer is 
subject to debate, for far more jobs per one million liters of water are created 
in agriculture (188 permanent on-site jobs) than in the proposed heavy 
industry (56 jobs). The cost of water supplied by Port Elizabeth to Coega 
industries would, at present, be the lowest rate, about US$0.40 per kiloliter 
The lack of cross-subsidization to basic users here represents a lost 
opportunity that can be explained by the social weight enjoyed by large 
corporations in Port Elizabeth municipal affairs. 
As for electricity, the zinc and phosphoric acid plants are anticipated to 
require four percent of Eskom’s available national surplus installed capacity, 
equivalent to about 25 percent of Port Elizabeth’s current demand. Again, the 
electricity rates proposed (the cheapest Eskom offers) do not provide any 
other consumers with a cross-subsidy. As discussed above, the various 
multiplier effects associated with subsidized domestic water and electricity 
consumption are rarely factored into formal pricing or resource allocation 
decisions, partly because the implications are so far-reaching for 
redistribution. Moreover, the primary reason that infrastructure investments 
do not pay off in terms merely of financial rates of return, is that many 
people do not have enough income to afford the recurrent (operating and 
maintenance) charges associated with the service.32  
                                                          
31S. McGillivray and Port Elizabeth Municipality, “Coega Industrial Development Zone Bulk 
Water Supply Infrastructure Requirements,” Report commissioned by the Coega IDZ Section 
21 Company, Port Elizabeth, 1997, p. 32. 
32Port Elizabeth already cross-subsidizes other activities from its electricity accounts (in 1997, 
this amounted to US$12 million in transfers on a budget of $163 million). But given municipal 
power relations, instead of promoting cross-subsidization from high-use commercial, industrial 
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As noted above, a universal and free lifeline supply is an alternative 
approach to meeting the needs of low-income people, for it better targets 
subsidies to those with low consumption. If 50 liters per day per person 
lifeline water and 20kWhs per month per person lifeline electricity were 
provided to all urban households in Port Elizabeth — not through means-
testing (which takes expensive state staff time), but instead on a universal 
basis consistent with the Constitution — a manageable amount of water (14 
million kl) and electricity (184 million kWhs) would be required per annum. 
Could Port Elizabeth afford this, even without national cross-subsidization? 
The municipality’s foregone revenue from providing the free lifeline services 
to all households would be approximately US$6.5 million for water and US$6 
million for electricity. With these costs nearly within the existing electricity 
budget surplus, there remains the issue of which sectors should be carrying 
the responsibility for the cross-subsidy associated with lifeline supply. 
The analysis depends upon the price elasticities of water and electricity, 
which are not feasible to estimate in cases where quite large increases might 
occur, and which vary substantially across the range of user groups. But in the 
case of water, a new seven-tier tariff structure on domestic consumption is 
expected to generate a surplus of about US$2.3 million per year beginning in 
1999. The tariff could easily be increased to achieve both conservation and 
revenue goals. In the case of electricity, current plans will allow the zinc 
smelter and phosphoric acid plant to avoid paying the Port Elizabeth 
municipality for their electricity (estimated to cost US$3 million per year) 
which would in turn prevent the municipality using these payments to raise a 
surplus on electricity sales. 
                                                                                                                                     
and residential consumers to low-income consumers, a municipal “Indigence Policy” was 
adopted in 1997 for households with less than US$80 per month (the level of state pension 
payouts). The means-tested subsidy applies only to effectively 6kl of water per month, for 
which, by mid-1998, 19,000 households received full (free) or half subsidy, even though some 
55,000 households are estimated to qualify for subsidies. Administrative costs are high, 
entailing wages of 80 full-time workers who must monitor the policy, and disconnections have 
risen significantly in the wake of its application (as the Council apparently believes there is 
increased legitimacy to disconnect those not accommodated for). Not only subsidized water, 
but unsubsidized electricity accounts are affected by this policy, and during the last three 
months of 1997 (a representative period), there were 12,698 electricity disconnections 
(followed by 9,931 reconnections) and 534 water disconnections (with 218 reconnections) 
(Department of Constitutional Development, “Project Viability Questionnaire #14,” Port 
Elizabeth, 1998, p. 4.) 
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In sum, there is far greater scope for cross-subsidization in water and 
electricity tariff structures in the Port Elizabeth municipal area. By making a 
huge public capital subsidy available to a project with such high levels of 
environmental destruction, and to compound this with vast public subsidies 
in recurrent water and energy services when so many Port Elizabeth residents 
face detrimental brown domestic ecological conditions, suggests that rather 
than an ecological modernization approach, the promoters of Coega have 
based their environmentalism upon extremely narrow, self-interested 
orthodox economic calculations. This conclusion was confirmed when in 
1999, in the wake of falling international zinc prices and the withdrawal of 
Billiton’s South Korean partner due to the East Asian crisis, rumors began to 
surface that the Port Elizabeth business elite were on the verge of changing 
strategies: instead of a zinc smelter, a German-headquartered stainless steel 
plant (South Africa’s third) could be built on the Coega site as part of a 
counter-trade arrangement associated with potential import of German 
submarines. However, substantial social-justice protest emerged, especially 
from churches, against the ANC government’s proposed $5 billion in arms 
spending, and the outcome of Coega — including the divergent discourses in 
play — would remain in doubt for concrete political and economic reasons, 
not because any particular argument was scientifically convincing and hence 
decisive. 
A third case study of natural resource utilization — the transfer of water 
from Lesotho to Johannesburg — amplifies the finding from infrastructure 
policy and the Coega project that privileged economic actors are still 
extremely powerful in post-apartheid decisions over distributional and 
environmental justice. 
 
THE LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT 
Water from the Maluti Mountains of tiny, landlocked Lesotho ordinarily 
tumbles down to the Orange River in South Africa, across a vast stretch of 
extremely fertile and then arid South African land, becomes the border with 
Namibia and makes its way into the Atlantic Ocean. From 1998, the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project (LHWP) began diverting to the Johannesburg area 
what will amount to a billion cubic meters of water annually — in Phases 1A 
(complete) and 1B (under construction from 1998), which cost US$4 billion 
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— via dams and cross-catchment tunnels.33 The water travels to the Vaal 
River and hence into an industrial complex comprising the Vaal Triangle 
(home of the steel industry), Johannesburg (Africa’s largest industrial 
complex) and Pretoria (South Africa’s capital city). In addition to farmers in 
Gauteng Province who draw freely from the river (and residual water that 
eventually joins the Orange River), 41 percent of the Vaal River is drawn out 
by the Rand Water Authority (in 1995) and distributed to middle-and upper-
income consumers (36 percent), low-income consumers (25 percent), 
industry (24 percent), mines (15 percent) and other users (10 percent). 
The LHWP was conceptualized during the 1950s colonial era in Lesotho, 
but it was only in the mid-1980s that the South African apartheid regime and 
Lesotho military-ruled client-government signed an agreement whose 
financing and socio-ecological technical work were arranged by the World 
Bank. This occurred under conditions of anti-apartheid financial sanctions, so 
had to be done largely surreptitiously, which the World Bank appreciated and 
lubricated through a special London-based funding mechanism. Indeed, the 
Bank (and allied northern government aid agencies) had a long role in 
fostering Lesotho’s underdevelopment, partly through continually denying 
the obvious linkage between systematic poverty and the fact that more than 
half the country’s GDP came from remittances from workers in South 
African mines a few hundred miles away. Bank and aid agency interventions 
typically entailed a combination of orthodox market-oriented rural 
modernization and the strengthening of a repressive state apparatus.34 
Notwithstanding the importance of the aid industry, Lesotho was and 
remains subservient to South Africa, reflected in a post-colonial history of 
regular manipulations of the Maseru government by Pretoria. For example, in 
September, 1998, in the wake of a rumored coup that seemed to have a 
substantial popular backing, the SA Defense Force invaded Lesotho 
                                                          
33For details, see D. Letsie, and P. Bond, “The Impact of Large-Scale Infrastructure Projects 
on Basic Needs: The Case of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project,” in M. Khosa and Y. 
Muthien, eds., 1999, op. cit.; and P. Bond, “The Political Economy of Dam Building and Water 
Supply in South Africa: Contesting the Impact of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project on 
Johannesburg,” forthcoming in D. McDonald, ed., Environmental Justice in South Africa (London: 
James Currey Press, 2000). 
34J. Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in 
Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994). 
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(followed by the Botswana Defense Force so as to give the invasion a 
Southern African Development Community aura). The first site the SA army 
secured — while Maseru’s business district was being burned virtually to the 
ground by angry rioters — was the Phase 1A Katse Dam (Africa’s largest-
ever public works project), which was rumored to be a potential bombing 
target of the coup plotters. Several dozen Lesotho troops were killed in the 
process. 
In addition to opposition from the ANC (until it assumed power in 
1994), the LHWP has been criticized from three different but parallel 
directions:  by Lesotho communities, churches and development NGOs; by 
international and Johannesburg-based environmentalists; and by Soweto and 
Alexandra township residents who consume the LHWP water. Each is 
considered in turn. 
The critique from indigenous communities relates not only to the Phase 
1A displacement of 2,000 people and loss of common resources (grazing 
land, topsoil, woodlots) or income through land submersion of at least 20,000 
more, and to the flooding of ancestral burial grounds (for which 
reimbursement and resettlement schemes were considered unsatisfactory to a 
majority of residents, according to 1997-98 surveys). There was also an 
increase in social problems consequent to the first dam’s construction, 
including a dramatic increase in AIDS, alcohol abuse, and livestock theft.  
“These negative impacts,” South African Water Minister Kader Asmal insists, 
“must be weighted against the benefits arising from the project, including 
access to improved health and educational facilities, water supply to 
communities, sanitation at schools, and, at villages close to the sites, the 
construction of community halls, community offices, creches, open markets 
and road access. One must also weigh in the benefit of employment 
opportunities for local people, both in the construction phase and in the 
considerable long-term maintenance tasks.”  
Under pressure from Lesotho groups and international 
environmentalists, and concerned about the reputation it gained for 
displacement-related suffering in large infrastructure projects, the World 
Bank has maintained a degree of concern about resettlement and 
compensation, as has Asmal. But by late 1998 many concerns remained, 
threatening the disbursement of the Bank’s Phase 1B loan. Finally, the 
corrupt character of Lesotho’s bureaucratic-bourgeois class-forming process 
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was also unveiled in 1999, when to the disgust of local critics and 
embarrassment (and denial) of the World Bank and South African 
government, a court case was heard against the Basothu chief executive 
officer of the LHWP, Masupha Sole. Prosecutors with access to Sole’s Swiss 
bank accounts proved that over a ten-year period he successfully induced bribes 
from some of the largest construction companies in the world, including 
ABB of Switzerland, Impregilio of Italy, and Dumez of France (which is 
owned by water-privatizer Lyonnais des Eaux, a regular subject of corruption 
charges).35 
The environmentalist critique has been more difficult to resolve. The 
LHWP exacerbates Lesotho’s scarcity of cultivated land (only nine percent 
can be used for farming), hence pushing peasants onto soil more vulnerable 
to erosion. The dams also destroy crucial habitats of the Maluti Minnow (an 
endangered species), bearded vulture and four other species considered 
“globally threatened.”36 Moreover, LHWP planning followed a purely 
economic logic:  early LHWP feasibility studies failed to include an 
Environmental Impact Assessment; linings for tunnels were inadequate and 
had to be cemented; reservoir-induced earthquakes were far worse than 
anticipated; and soil erosion and sedimentation — which typically lowers dam 
capacity by one percent per year and silts intake areas — were not initially 
accounted for. According to Snaddon, Wishart and Davies, “This will be the 
largest Inter-Basin Transfer in southern Africa, and it will result in 
considerable alterations of the rivers concerned. These systems will remain 
unstable for a very long time. The overall environmental effects of the 
LHWP have not adequately been assessed, and assessments of the instream 
flow requirements of the rivers involved in the scheme have focussed only on 
the donor systems.”37 Indeed downstream, the Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry admitted that even in 1996 it could not “yet claim that it has 
                                                          
35Business Day, August 5, 1999; Washington Post, September 13, 1999. 
36See K. Horter, “The Mountain Kingdom’s White Oil: The Lesotho Highlands Water 
Project,” The Ecologist, 25, 6, 1995 and  “Making the Earth Rumble: The Lesotho-South Africa 
Water Connection,” Multinational Monitor, May, 1996. 
37C.D. Snaddon, et al., “Some Implications of Inter-Basin Water Transfers for River 
Functioning and Water Resources Management in South Africa,” in Group for Environmental 
Monitoring, ed., Record of Proceedings: Lesotho Highlands Water Workshop, Johannesburg, August 
29-30, 1996. 
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conclusively determined the present and future irrigation water requirements 
in the study area.”38 Lesotho’s own access to water is also now a matter of 
concern, with all experts and commentators now certain that there is 
insufficient water in the country to share with South Africa beyond (the still-
planned) LHWP Phase 2, and within 10 to 30 years Lesotho would itself 
likely face a condition of water scarcity.39 
The consumer critique emanated, particularly in 1998, from Soweto and 
Alexandra residents who forcefully contradicted President Nelson Mandela’s 
developmental justification (in a 1995 letter to World Bank President James 
Wolfensohn):  “We in South Africa need the water from the LHWP to meet 
the increase in our demand, and, in particular, to meet the needs of previously 
neglected communities.”40 Instead, insisted community groups (“civic 
associations”) from the impoverished Johannesburg townships, the LHWP 
makes water provision to low-income black people more, not less, difficult. 
In 1995, approximately 1.5 million residents of Gauteng Province did not 
have direct access to water, and to supply them with 50 liters per person per 
day would have required only 22 million cubic meters of additional supply 
annually, representing a small fraction of the water that middle- and upper-
income consumers used to water gardens and fill swimming pools.41 The key 
issue was that a vast proportion of incoming water (probably more than half 
in most townships) leaked out of apartheid-era infrastructure, which black 
households were expected to pay for. The possibilities for conservation were 
estimated by some credible officials at 40 percent. But the LHWP water 
distribution structure meant that the main catchment-area intermediary, 
which should have been in a position to fix leaks and promote conservation 
through “demand side management,” had the reverse incentive, namely to 
charge municipalities for high-level consumption in order to make payments 
                                                          
38Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, The Orange River Project Replanning Study, Pretoria, 
1996, p. 4. 
39G. Addison, “Dam It, Let’s Pour Concrete,” Saturday Star, November 3, 1998. 
40K. Asmal, “Speech to GEM Workshop on Lesotho Highlands Water Project,” in Group for 
Environmental Monitoring, ed., 1996, op. cit., p. 2. 
41R. Archer, Trust in Construction? The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (London: Christian Aid and 
Maseru, Christian Council of Lesotho, 1996), pp. 58-59. 
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on LHWP interest charges. Hence given limited municipal resources, the 
expectation was that the leaks would not be fixed. 
As a result, for consumers to pay for the LHWP would mean raising the 
real marginal price of water dramatically (the World Bank suggests by a factor 
of five once Phase 1B is complete, to accurately reflect cost increases). 
Moreover, while bulk water charges to municipalities rose by 35 percent 
between 1995 and 1998 in large part due to the LHWP, the levy for the first 
(lowest) block of the Johannesburg block tariff increased by 55 percent,42 
indicating that relatively speaking, first-block consumers paid a higher 
proportion of the increase than did consumers who used more water. Could 
tariffs be adjusted to make high-use consumers pay a higher share? In 
principle yes, but recall that opposition to block tariffs stemmed partly from 
the (World Bank) logic that privatization “would be harder to establish” if 
fully profitable cost-price relations were not permitted. With municipal 
bankruptcies at record levels during the late 1990s (fully half of South Africa’s 
878 towns were anticipated to require merger into larger districts, including 
several of Gauteng’s smaller cities), such privatization pressure was becoming 
overwhelming. 
So, too, was pressure intensifying to cut off non-paying consumers, both 
from central government and the World Bank. In October, 1995, World 
Bank water expert Roome suggested that a “credible threat” was needed to 
discipline residents who continued the municipal payments boycotts begun 
during the 1980s, and indeed within 18 months it materialized.43 From 
January to December, 1997 there was more than a ten-fold increase in water 
cut-offs in Gauteng, and a decline from 50 percent to 20 percent in the 
proportion of those who were cut off that then reconnected. The rate of 
water cuts intensified further in 1998, with entire townships disconnected in 
some cases, including individual households who had paid their bills. The 
LHWP-related water price increases were to some extent responsible, 
although a challenge by three Alexandra residents to further World Bank 
loans for Phase 1B until better conservation and distributional-equity 
                                                          
42World Bank Inspection Panel, “Lesotho/South Africa: Phase 1B of Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project: Panel Report and Recommendation,” Washington, DC, August 19, 1998, p. 81. 
43Roome, “Water Pricing and Management,” 1995, op. cit., p. 51. 
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measures were applied — heard by the World Bank Inspection Panel in mid-
1998 — was rejected on grounds of a “very tenuous” link.44 
The three critiques have not been ignored, and indeed the World Bank 
and Asmal defended the LHWP in part using an ecological modernization 
discourse backed by extensive studies and the threat of drought. Roome, for 
example, took pains to rebut the “possible controversial aspects” associated 
with the social, ecological and consumer critiques, particularly given that 
“some International NGOs (e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, International 
Rivers Network) may not support the Bank’s decision to proceed with the 
funding of Phase 1B at this time — partly related to the issues set out below 
(basically judgment calls on whether progress in Phase 1A has been 
satisfactory and whether the economics of delays to Phase 1B are acceptable), 
but partly on principle as part of the larger ‘big dams’ debate.”45 The LHWP, 
Roome continued, “provides an opportunity to advance the debate that not 
all big dams are necessarily bad....The argument against large dams contends 
that they:  are not economically viable; are not socially acceptable; are 
environmentally disastrous; can be a major cause of impoverishment, and can 
result in unacceptably high international debt.” Roome insisted that “the 
economics show that this is lowest cost supply, has a good Economic Rate of 
Return and demand management is being put in place; socially the numbers 
involved are low, there has been ‘good planning’ but implementation key; 
environmentally the impact is limited and has been well managed; poverty-
wise the project supports poverty reduction activities and does not squeeze 
out other activities; and fiscally SA bears the debt, not Lesotho and users pay 
— not tax payers.”46 
The LHWP principle of “users-pay” (i.e., full cost-recovery) is the 
giveaway indication that, as in infrastructure provision more generally, 
orthodox economic logic is overriding considerations of sustainable ecology 
(at the dam site, downstream in the Orange River, and in terms of waste by 
                                                          
44World Bank Inspection Panel, “Panel Report and Recommendation,” 1998, op. cit., p. 80. 
45World Bank, “Lesotho: Lesotho Highlands Water Project — Phase 1B: Project Appraisal 
Document,” (17727-LSO), R98-106(PAD), Water and Urban 1, Africa Region, Washington, 
DC, April 30, 1998, p. 18. 
46Ibid., p. 1. 
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affluent Gauteng consumers, industry and farmers) and environmental justice 
(with respect to low-income Gauteng residents’ access to water and 
sanitation). Ironically, the World Bank’s 1994 World Development Report on 
infrastructure had set out an ecological modernization argument that linked 
these discourses:  “[The] block tariff links price to volume, and it is more 
efficient at reaching the poor than a general subsidy because it limits 
subsidized consumption. Increasing-block tariffs also encourage water 
conservation and efficient use by increasing charges at higher use.”47 This 
argument was rejected, ultimately, it appears, because Bank staff (Roome and 
the UIIF authors) convinced even a minister wedded to eco-social justice 
rhetoric (Asmal) that the merits of attracting private investors into the water 
sector were so great, and the fiscally-shrinking state was so incapable of its 
own infrastructural investment, as to warrant the full-fledged 
commodification and pricing of water in a manner conducive to capital 
accumulation. 
 
CONCLUSION:  TOWARDS A PROGRESSIVE STRATEGY 
Thus the three arguments relating to political-economic-ecology have 
found sites of fruitful conflict, have occasionally intertwined, and have begun 
to settle into predictable discursive patterns. This is dangerous, however, 
mirroring the all-too-predictable back-and-forth political swings around 
variants of mild-mannered Keynesian stimulations in macroeconomic policy 
(in a South African context which includes the highest real interest rates in 
the country’s history, excessive financial liberalization and capital flight, 
deindustrialization and dramatic unemployment). Throughout South Africa’s 
recent history, epic battles were waged between contending forces, in which 
two substantial armies — the “Democratic Movement” (a combination of 
proxy for the ANC and independent left civil society groups) on the one 
hand, and the apartheid state (and its business and conservative civil society 
supporters), on the other — ultimately gridlocked the political terrain, such 
that the outcome cannot be described as particularly pleasing to anyone.  
In the environmental arena, it may well be that the only strategic way 
forward for progressive forces, given the growing hegemony of orthodox 
                                                          
47World Bank, World Development Report, 1994, op. cit., p. 81. 
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economic prescription and the lack of potential to change the state’s 
orientation away from lubricating capital accumulation at any cost, is to build 
tougher, more durable alliances between community, labor and 
environmental activists. These will occur, increasingly, on terrain of existing 
conflicts, such as the urban conflagrations over access to municipal services. 
There, not only is a potentially new generation of militant community 
organizations reconstituting itself (in 1997, a Gauteng province “Association 
of Residents and Civic Organizations” was established from the Alexandra, 
Soweto, Tembisa and other core civics), but so, too, are municipal workers 
increasingly aware of the danger that alongside ecologically-destructive 
infrastructure investments, will come “public-private partnerships” (a 
euphemism for privatization) which threaten their jobs. 
As for ecological activism, however, there remains a great deal of 
conscientization required before the (traditionally white, middle-class) 
leadership of activist groups take the “brown agenda” (urban low-income 
people’s immediate ecological needs) on board and thereby confront the 
limits of ecological modernization discourses, and indeed the structural 
conditions that lie behind South Africa’s environmental crises. Even the 
Environmental Justice Networking Forum — an impressive, extremely active 
network with substantial township and rural organizational membership — 
has tended to neglect structural forms of urban environmental degradation, 
preferring to label as environmentally racist merely the most obvious 
practices of differential pollution. Causes rooted in capitalist economics, and 
the impacts of broader, interrelated policies (such as the infrastructure 
investment issues discussed above), are difficult to raise, much less address, 
within the constraints of coalition politics. 
Thus the need for semi-peripheral South African capitalism to retain — 
as just one of its post-apartheid privileges — a particularly cheap labor force, 
has generally gone unquestioned. The cheapness of that labor force will, as 
ever, be largely a function of reducing the costs of reproducing labor power 
(thanks to the lower post-apartheid levels of recurrent municipal service 
payments, for those low-income workers without sewage and electricity 
connections). Prospects for challenging the low service levels — and their 
attendant environmental problems — are dim, given the ANC government’s 
adoption of a World Bank-designed infrastructure investment policy 
framework; its promotion of export-led, electricity-guzzling zinc instead of 
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retail energy; and its supply of Lesotho water to Johannesburg-area firms and 
mining houses at a disproportionate cost to the urban poor. And yet, 
notwithstanding how stark these contradictions are, and how many riots 
urban residents have already engaged in around infrastructure, and how well 
the municipal workers union has joined the struggle to treat infrastructure 
and services as public not private goods, the strategy has not yet begun to pay 
off. Routes out of urban environmental injustice are arduous, just as attempts 
to invoke ecological modernization themes — the internalization of 
externalities in infrastructure policy-making; cost-benefit analysis in the siting 
of industrial developments like the Coega zinc smelter; or demand-side 
management instead of an increased supply of Lesotho water — have not yet 
proven sufficiently convincing to overcome the orthodox economic 
insistence on GDP growth. 
Yet the challenge for serious environmentalists, David Harvey insists, 
remains to continue seeking opportunities for alliances — of “militant 
particularist” groups (to borrow Raymond Williams’ expression), whether 
Lesotho communities, South African municipal workers, Alexandra township 
residents or traditional green activists — around these ecological issues, so as 
to one day address 
the material and institutional issues of how to organize production 
and distribution in general, how to confront the realities of global 
power politics and how to displace the hegemonic powers of 
capitalism not simply with dispersed, autonomous, localized, and 
essentially communitarian solutions (apologists for which can be 
found on both right and left ends of the political spectrum), but 
with a rather more complex politics that recognizes how 
environmental and social justice must be sought by a rational 
ordering of activities at different scales. The reinsertion of “rational 
ordering” indicates that such a movement will have no option, as it 
broadens out from its militant particularist base, but to reclaim for 
itself a noncoopted and nonperverted version of the theses of 
ecological modernization. On the one hand that means subsuming 
the highly geographically differentiated desire for cultural autonomy 
and dispersion, for the proliferation of tradition and difference 
within a more global politics, but on the other hand making the 
quest for environmental and social justice central rather than 
peripheral concerns. For that to happen, the environmental justice 
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movement has to radicalize the ecological modernization 
discourse.48 
If the cases above provide any lessons along these lines, such 
radicalization is possible, though still extremely difficult. 
 
                                                          
48D. Harvey, 1996, op. cit., pp. 400-401. 
